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1. Introduction 
Notwithstanding recent interest in the study of constitutional amendment rules, there is very limited 
scholarship investigating the structure of formal amendment framework and little doctrinal debate on the 
role of upper houses, as sub-national units’ representatives, played in national amendment process and 
their capacity to strengthen the rigidity of constitutions.  
It is well-known that amendment rules are at the core of constitutionalism,1 define the conditions under 
which all other constitutional norms may be legally displaced,2 and provide mechanisms for societies to 
refine their constitutional arrangements.3 It is also confirmed that the commonest form of representation 
in upper houses – in both federal and non-federal states – is territorial, and, in such systems, members 
generally represent areas contiguous with sub-national levels of government, provinces, regions or states.4 
From an institutional framework view, this paper emphasizes the rules according to which the upper 
houses, as sub-national units’ representatives, boost constitutional revision processes identifying the 
                                                          
* Peer reviewed. I am grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts to Francesco Palermo, Eduardo 
Gianfrancesco, G. Alan Tarr, Giuseppe Martinico. This paper was presented at the Second Conference in Memory 
of Gabriella Angiulli – Bicameralism under pressure, Constitutional Reform of National Legislatures, 2-3 May 
2016, organized by the Center for Parliamentary Studies CESP LUISS in cooperation with the University of Milan 
(Department of National and Supranational Public Law), the International Society of Public Law (ICON-S), and 
the Younger Comparativists Committee (YCC). 
1 J.L. MARSHFIELD, Decentralizing the Amendment Power, in U. Ark. Research Paper, n. 15(3)/2015, p. 4.  
2 A.R. AMAR, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, in Colum. L. Rev., n. 94/1994, 
p. 461. 
3 Z. ELKINS – T. GINSBURG – J. MELTON,The Endurance of National Constitutions, Cambridge, 2009, p. 81. 
4 M. RUSSELL, What are second chambers for?, in Parliamentary Affairs, n. 54/2001, p. 444. 
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patterns typically applied within domestic constitutional space. The analysis of amendment rules and the 
role of a Second Chamber in these processes in different European legal orders5 will allow for a 
comparison of the revision procedures on a higher level – the supranational one.  
First, assessing the advantages and disadvantages underpinning the reasons of sub-national units’ 
inclusion in constitutional amendment procedures, it presents some theoretical rationales. Examining the 
amendment rules and those mechanisms which gradually structure the constitutional rigidity, it identifies 
some national paradigms which can help to design (a) supranational paradigm(s) and make some remarks 
on the procedure of Treaty revision which encloses elements of rigidity. 
Although the EU is not a State and the Lisbon Treaty is not a Constitution, the comparison with the 
constitutional revision procedures of certain Member States, especially those with a decentralized 
structure, consents to analyze whether the mechanism of including national parliaments aggravates the 
Treaty amendment processes and to assess the impact on the quasi-constitutional configuration of the 
EU which deserves to be further developed in the perspective of the configuration of national legislatures 
as ‘territorial parliaments’ and their more incisive participation in the process of ‘formal European 
constitutional change’. 
 
2. Upper Houses in National Constitutional Amendment Processes: Rationales 
Bicameral systems include sub-national units by dedicating a legislative chamber to their interests and 
requiring that constitutional amendments be approved by that chamber.6 It is not self-evident that sub-
national units should be directly included in the processes of national constitutional amendment7 but, 
where they exist, it seems most fair, legitimate, and efficient for national suitable chamber to initiative 
and ratify constitutional amendments considering sub-national communities’ interests. There is no space 
for an in-depth analysis,8 but for the purpose of the topic there could be identified at least three legitimate 
and significant rationales for bicameralism allowing sub-national units to participate directly or indirectly 
in the constitutional amendment processes.  
 
                                                          
5 Especially in those domestic legal systems in which sub-national components are predominant such as Austria, 
Belgium and Germany as federal states and France, Italy and Spain as non-federal states. 
6 N. ARONEY, Formation, Representation and Amendment in Federal Constitutions, in Am. J. Comp. L., n. 54(2)/2006, p. 
326. 
7 For example, three federal systems constitutionally recognize sub-national government but do not include sub-
national units in constitutional amendment process (Venezuela, the United Arab Emirates, and The Federation 
of Saint Christopher and Nevis) 
8 See paper presented at the same conference by M. ROMANIELLO, Bicameralism: a concept in search of a theory, now 
in Amministrazione in cammino, 20 September 2016, available at 
www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it/app/uploads/2016/09/Romaniello.pdf  
  
4        federalismi.it - ISSN 1826-3534                        |n. 9/2018 
 
 
 
  
2.1. Legitimacy pattern 
In federal states which are predicated, at least in part, on a joining or union of pre-existing political units, 
the national constitution represents an agreement between political communities regarding the terms of 
the federal union.9 The legitimacy of the national constitution arises from the consent of the sub-national 
communities that created it. Thus, many early scholars of federalism concluded that federalism demands 
an amending procedure in which the states as separate entities play a part.10 National constitutional change 
can occur only with the consent of the component units because their consent is necessary to legitimate 
the new conditions of the federal union. Thus, it is important that amendment rules provide a mechanism 
for ‘eliciting’ that consent from sub-national units. 
In reality, this perspective on federalism seems somewhat oversimplified and fails to fully describe the 
majority of contemporary decentralized states. The Constitution of Switzerland, for example, is the only 
extant constitution that expressly identifies itself as a ‘(con)federation’ formed by the ‘Swiss People’ and 
the ‘Cantons’. This suggests that legitimacy derives from both the national community and the Cantons.  
In general, it is said that bicameralism preserves federalism. Under ‘federal bicameralism’, the lower house 
is typically apportioned on the basis of population, while the upper house is divided amongst the regional 
units by providing an equal representation (see USA), or unequally apportion the upper chamber by 
providing additional representation to the larger units (see Germany). 
Other states have constitutionalized sub-national governments but expressly rejected the notion that their 
national constitutions are based in any way on the union of pre-existing communities. Italy is a prominent 
example. The Constitution, recognizing the unitary republic11, listing the Regions12, distinguishing two 
different degree of their autonomy,13 and introducing them among the components of the State,14 does 
not echoed, actually, the pre-existing communities (Regno or Ducato). The particular historical 
circumstances of 1948 and fears for secession of some territories15 contribute to the establishment of 
sub-national level of government in some pre-existing territories. In order to avoid asymmetries between 
these and other areas of the country, it was found a solution between federal and unitary state – a ‘quasi-
                                                          
9 See J.L. MARSHFIELD, Models of Subnational Constitutionalism, in Penn. St. L. Rev., n. 115/2011, pp. 1151-1558; 
K. LENAERTS, Constitutionalism and the Many Facets of Federalism, in Am. J. Comp. L., n. 38/1990, pp. 205-206; J.A. 
GARDNER, Interpreting State Constitutions. A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System, Spring, 2005, pp. 80-143. 
10 J. BRYCE, Studies in History and J urisprudence, New York, 1901, p. 173; C J . FRIEDRICH, Constitutional 
Government and Democracy, rev. ed., Boston, 1950, p. 209. 
11 Article 5, Italian Const.: “The Republic is one and indivisible. […]” 
12 Article 131, Italian Const. 
13 Five so-called “special” or “autonomous” Regions enjoy of higher degree of autonomy (Article 116) and the 15 
ordinary Regions with limited legislative power in some fields (Article 117).  
14 Article 114, Italian Const. 
15 Especially, Sardegna, Sicilia, Valle d’Aosta. 
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federal’ regionalism16 – and an “absurd and cumbersome”17 bicameralism, “merely looking for trouble”18, 
in which the Senate, “elected on regional basis”19, is not a place where the new regions are represented.20 
Moreover, the Const. Law 9 February 1963, no. 2, establishing the same five years term for both 
chambers, not only had eliminated any residual protecting function of the regional interests in the Senate, 
but also had asserted the political criteria on which the Upper House foundations is based and its effective 
role in the pursuit of the integration of the general representation.21 In any case, in this framework, 
Regions (more specifically, Regional Councils) enjoy initiating amendment powers as well as represent a 
subject eligible to submit a referendum proposal on an amendment approved by the chambers. After 
different waves of bicameralism and constitutional reforms implicating the regional asset of Italian 
system, the constitutional reform promoted by Renzi Government tried to put an end to the long search 
of a ”bicameralism that makes sense”22 and a Senate as a ‘Chamber of the Regions’. In this event, the 
constitutional reform would have introduced an increased element of regional representation into 
Parliament without sharing the characteristics of the German Bundesrat in which the Länder are directly 
represented.23  
The expressly mention of the sub-national entities in the constitutional text is not always the ratio for 
setting up an Upper House representative of territorial communities. From this viewpoint, Belgium and 
Austria present an unusual background. Belgian Constitution establishes the federal structure of the State 
                                                          
16 See F. PALERMO, Asymmetric, “Quasi-Federal” regionalism and Protection of Minorities. The case of Italy, in G. ALAN 
TARR – R.F. WILLIAMS – J. MARKO (eds.), Federalism. Subnational Constitutions, And Minority Rights, Westport, 
2004, pp. 109-113.  
17 V. CRISAFULLI, Incontro democratico e rifondazione dello Stato: atti del convegno di studio svoltosi a Firenze il 17-18 giugno 
1973, Milano, 1973, p. 14. 
18 See K.C. WHEARE, Legislatures, London, 1963, p. 200, referring to perfect bicameralism into parliamentary legal 
system. 
19 Article 57, Italian Const.; concept understood as a geographical area within which to carry out the election of 
Senators, without implying any effective representation of the Region in the Senate and a tie between the Senate 
and the regional institutions. See C. FUSARO – M. RUBECHI, Articolo 57, in R. BIFULCO – A. CELOTTO – 
M. OLIVETTI (cur.), Commentario alla Costituzione, Vol. 2, Torino, 2006, pp. 1143-1154. 
20 See P. AIMO, Bicameralismo e Regioni. La camera delle autonomie: nascita e tramonto di un’idea. La genesi del Senato alla 
Costituente, Milano, 1997, pp. 113-168. 
21 F. PALERMO – M. NICOLINI, Bicameralismo. Pluralismo e limiti della rappresentanza in prospettiva comparata, Napoli, 
2013, p. 99. See also E. CHELI, Bicameralismo, in Digesto delle discipline pubblicistiche, Vol. 2 Torino, 1987, pp. 318-325; 
A. BARBERA, Oltre il bicameralismo, in Democrazia e diritto, n. 3/1981; L. PALADIN, Per una storia costituzionale 
dell’Italia repubblicana, Bologna, 2004; L. CASTELLI, Il Senato delle autonomie. Ragioni, modelli, vicende, Padova, 2010.  
22 On different reforms of the Senate, see C. FUSARO, La lunga ricerca di un bicameralismo che abbia senso, in A. 
BARBERA – G. GUZZETTA (cur.), Il governo dei cittadini: referendum elettorali e riforma della politica, Soveria Mannelli, 
2007, pp. 653-690; S. BONFIGLIO, Il Senato in Italia. Riforma del bicameralismo e modelli di rappresentanza, Roma-Bari, 
2009.  
23 On the uncertain nature of the new Senate see N. LUPO, La (ancora) incerta natura del nuovo Senato: prevarrà il 
cleavage politico, territoriale o istituzionale?, in Federalismi.it, n.4/2016. See also R. BIN, Le elezioni e il nodo del Senato, in 
Forumcostituzionale.it, 2013. 
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composed of Communities and Regions,24 but the inclusion of these communities into Upper House 
aims at promoting, in fact, different voices in the amendment process and at improving deliberation.25 In 
Austria, despite the Constitution distinguishes the form of State and lists the Länders26, the representative 
chamber of the provinces, however, was not designed for replying the federalist composition; from the 
beginning, Austrian Bundesrat was more a ‘forum’ for political debate that a meeting point of territorial 
interests with those of the Federation.27 Actually, both chambers were established to perform legislation 
and exercise control over the executive.  
The general rational for a bicameral system is to ensure the balance competing bases for representation. 
In fact, two legislative chambers provide a more appropriate and flexible institutional explanation for the 
representational diversity. A system of proportional representation and representation’s differences result 
in the membership of Parliament reflecting broader dissimilar interests and a more democratic and 
reflective legislative branch of the concerns of the people and units it serves. 
 
2.2. Checks-And-Balances pattern 
In some federal systems, sub-national government exists to provide a ‘check’ on national institutions and 
government in general and on amendment processes, in particular in informal one.28 As Madison’s well-
known justification for American federalism, by dividing government power between national and sub-
national institutions, it is hoped that both levels of government have incentives to monitor each other, 
which can prevent government abuses and protect liberty.29 Madison’s design is relevant to amendment 
rules for a twofold motive. First, through checks-and-balances national government cannot amend the 
constitution without by-passing or excluding subnational governments. Second, the amendment power, 
like any government power, can be misused especially if it is consolidated in an institution. In 
consequence, it makes sense to shape a checks-and-balances system for the amendment processes too. 
If the amendment power encloses its own checks-and-balances, it is likely to require and involve both 
national and subnational communities to consider the proposed amendments giving each level of 
government an effective means of precluding misuse of the amendment power.  
                                                          
24 Articles 1-4, Belgian Const. 
25 See G. CONTI, Il procedimento di revisione costituzionale in deroga all'art. 195 della Costituzione belga. Dall'Accordo Papillon 
alla nuova riforma dello Stato, in Osservatorioaic.it, February 2014.  
26 Article 2(1) and (2), Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG). 
27 See F. PALERMO, Riforme e proposte di riforma del Bundesrat in Germania e Austria, in Rass. Parl., n. 49(1)/2007, pp. 
131-149. 
28 See R. DIXON, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective,  in T. GINSBURG – R. DIXON (eds.), 
Comparative  Constitutional  Law, Cheltenham-Northampton, 2011, pp. 96-103.   
29 See The Federalist Papers Nos. 46, 47, 51, in The Federalist Papers,  Penguin, 1987. See also R. DEHOUSSE, Il 
paradosso di Madison: Riflessioni sul ruolo delle camere alte nei sistemi federali, in Le Regioni, n. 17/1989), pp. 1365-1400. 
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A rationale reason for having a bicameral system is to ensure the role of Parliament in holding the 
government to account and checking or restraining its power. In most instances, and in legal orders as 
highlighted before – Belgian and Austrian –, a Second Chamber with broadly equal powers to the first 
affords a more effective check on government conduct. This kind of ‘contestatory federalism’ describes 
a “conception of divided power that justifies federalism as a method of protecting liberty through the 
institutionalization of a permanent contest for power between national and subnational units of 
government.”30 
This checks-and-balances system fails, however, if national institutions can unilaterally amend the 
national constitution to circumvent (or eliminate) sub-national government. Under those conditions, 
national government would have less incentive to respect sub-national government, and sub-national 
government would have less incentive to challenge the national government. Even if entrenchment of 
constitutional provisions provides some protection for sub-national government in this regard, a stronger 
protection is to include sub-national government in the amendment process. If sub-national government 
is included, it can confidently challenge national action without fear of a unilateral constitutional response 
by the national government. 
Although this rationale may justify inclusion of sub-national units in amendment processes in some 
systems, it does not explain those systems that have adopted cooperative principles but nevertheless 
included sub-national units in the amendment process. A valid example is represented by German 
‘cooperative federalism’31 in which the rules of constitutional amendments include the approval of 
Länders’ executives represented in the Upper House (Bundesrat), set a ‘bicameral’ procedure, similar to that 
required for federal ordinary laws (Zustimmungsgesetze), but aggravated by the qualified majorities necessary 
for the deliberation of the amendments in both chambers. Despite weakened intervention powers of the 
Bundesrat in order to prevent from becoming an obstacle into decision-making process, this chamber rests 
the primary instrument of check and veto exercised over central government. To the extent that it is 
difficult to avoid improper political use of this chamber, there should be a broad consensus at the political 
level, a sort of cooperation between government majority and opposition forces, which, at the expense 
of the same governing majority, is all the more evident as the composition of the Bundesrat is altered.32  
 
  
                                                          
30 J.A. GARDNER – A.A. ININET, Sustainable Decentralization: Power, Extraconstitutional Influence, and Subnational 
Symmetry in the United States and Spain , in Am . J. Comp L  59/2011, p. 491.  
31 A.B. GUNLICKS, The Länder and German Federalism, Manchester&New York, 2003, p. 61. 
32 F. PALERMO – M. NICOLINI, Bicameralismo, op.cit., p. 261. 
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2.3. Self-governance pattern 
Some systems decentralize political power to promote self-governance by sub-national communities33 
which can exercise a degree of political self-determination.34 Sub-national government can allow 
communities to enact their own policies (through sub-national legislatures) enforce their own laws 
(through sub-national executives), and resolve their own disputes (through sub-national tribunals). This 
kind of representation could be met in the divided societies comprising many diverse subnational groups. 
A particular example is given by Spain, a unitary state in which Catalonia asked in many occasions for its 
independence invoking self-determination. In theory, the people of Catalonia - respecting the rules on 
the constitutional amendment procedure - could propose either a total or partial revision of the 
constitution. Given the unitary framework of the system, the question is whether they could ask for a 
more regional autonomy and a constitutional change of their status without compromising the state as a 
political unit. But, as stated by the Article 138(2) of Spanish Constitution “differences between Statutes 
of the different Self-governing Communities may in no case imply economic or social privileges”. 
Moreover, it should be considered that any initiative regarding their self-governing should be approved 
by the Cortes Generales, which can takes over the initiative any time if the conditions of Article 143 are not 
satisfied.  
However, for political self-determination to be meaningful, sub-national government must have some 
degree of independence. Implicitly, in such a system, sub-national governments would operate without 
interference from national institutions.35 Although this ‘space’ can be preserved through a variety of 
different mechanisms, a particularly effective method of ensuring that sub-national communities retain a 
degree of independence is to guarantee that they can participate in any amendments to the national 
constitutional structure. Including sub-national units in that process helps ensure that community rights, 
which might implicate only a minority of citizens in the aggregate national community, are not infringed 
by national political institutions representing majoritarian preferences. 
This may explain why some decentralized systems concerned with protecting sub-national political 
communities include sub-national government in the amendment process. As explained in more detail 
below, this rationale is most obvious if the sub-national government is included in only those 
amendments that affect their rights and duties. These subject-matter limitations on sub-national 
                                                          
33 See Spanish Const., Ch.3. 
34 See G. ALAN TARR, Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights: A Perspective on Canadian Provincial 
Constitutionalism, in Rutgers L. J., n. 40/2009, pp. 767-783. 
35 See R. WILLIAMS – G. ALAN TARR, Subnational Constitutional Space: A View From the States, Provinces, Regions, 
Lander and Cantons, in G. ALAN TARR – R.F. WILLIAMS – J. MARKO (eds.), Federalism, op.cit., pp. 15-16. 
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involvement aim to ensure that sub-national communities retain a degree of control over their status in 
the constitutional structure. 
 
3. Upper Houses in National Constitutional Amendment Processes: Mechanisms 
This part delivers a summary of national paradigms, identifying different approaches to including (directly 
or indirectly) sub-national components in the process of formal constitutional change, and presenting a 
preliminary assessment of each method. 
 
3.1. Representation Paradigm 
The most common way that sub-national units are included in national amendment processes is by 
providing them with representation in the national legislature, which is responsible for initiating or 
ratifying proposed amendments. This method can take many different forms and provide for varying 
degrees of representation for sub-national units through a separate (‘upper’) legislative chamber.  
‘Federal bicameralism’ has fulfilled two essential tasks: on the one hand, that of representing the federated 
states of federal nations; and on the other, that of identifying a political body of the central government 
within which compose unity/political-territorial pluralism dialectics governing constitutional order. 
However, what does it mean the representation of federated states by a suitable branch? First, there is a 
political sense of representation according to which members of Upper House are directly elected by the 
federated communities, represent the specific community of those sub-national units, are accountable to 
the electorate, and are required to shape their will autonomously from the federated communities which 
they represent or their governments. Second, the representation in its judicial meaning refers to the 
nomination of the federal chambers’ members by the constituent units’ executives, namely federated 
governments delegate their members who are toughly accountable to their communities and who express 
the will of their executives that they represent and only indirectly those of the electorate.36  
                                                          
36 See H. PITKIN, The Concept of Representation, Berkeley, 1967, making a distinction between delegates and 
representatives which correspond to the distinction made by G. Sartori between representatives in the juridical and 
in the political sense (see G. SARTORI, Elementi di teoria politica, Bologna, 1987, p. 285). The distinction between 
political and judicial representation allows to identify two different models of federal bicameralism: the Senate 
model which corresponds to the political representation as long as the chamber is similar to a regular parliamentary 
assembly and its members act as normal legislators (e.g. Austria and Belgium); and Council model related to judicial 
representation and pursuant to which the members of the Upper House are completely different from regular 
legislators (e.g. Germany). See T.O. HUEGLIN – A. FENNA, Comparative Federalism. A Systematic Inquiry, Toronto, 
2015, 2nd ed., p. 207 (defining the Council model); G. DORIA, The Paradox of Federal Bicameralism, in European 
Diversity and Autonomy Papers, n.5/2006, available at www.eurac.edu/edap, pp. 8-16; F. PALERMO – M. 
NICOLINI, Bicameralismo, op.cit., pp. 156-162; R.L. WATTS, Comparing Federal Systems, Montreal, 2008, p. 141 
(referring to senatorial model, and ambassadorial model instead of council model). On the meaning of 
ambassadorial solution of the European Union see infra 4. 
  
10        federalismi.it - ISSN 1826-3534                        |n. 9/2018 
 
 
 
  
Scholarship and constitutional studies have accused federal chambers of failing in performing their duty, 
and of having evolved into party-dominated institutions, barely distinguishable from their popular 
counterparts.37 Where political representation gathers prominence, Senators “tend to vote along party 
lines rather than strictly for the regional interest they represent”.38  
However, a peculiar political framework of sub-national representativeness in Upper House can be traced 
also in legal systems dominated by a judicial representation, such as Germany, where, although it was 
structured to represent the federated states as institutions (according to the rule that the Länder 
representatives delegated in Bundesrat must vote “as a unit”39) and represented a ‘very federal house’40, 
Bundesrat has ended up assuming an incontestable party-political role, conditioning, through the legislative 
powers constitutionally conferred, the action of the Bundestag, including constitutional amendment 
processes.41  
Interestingly, territorial representation is met also in a few systems that are formally unitary. In such 
models of ‘non-federal’ bicameralism, different ways of designation of sub-national entities’ 
representatives in the Upper House and, consequently, their inclusion in the amendment process, have 
proven valuable in promoting pluralism; it is the represented pluralism (or better, political-territorial pluralism), 
                                                          
37 See M. RUSSELL, The Territorial Role of the Upper House, in J. Leg. St., n. 7(1)/2001, pp. 105-118; W. SWENDEN, 
Federalism and Second Chambers, Brussels, 2004. 
38 R.L. WATTS, op.cit., p. 141. See also M. RUSSELL, What are Second Chamber for?, in Parl. Aff., n. 54(3)/2001, p. 
445. For instance, in Austria, the tie between the Bundesrat and Länder Diets is both elective, as long as the members 
of Federal Council are elected by sub-national parliaments, both personal, as long as the eligibility to Landtag is a 
prerequisite for the passive electorate to the Federal Council, and political, as long as the composition of the 
Federal Council depends on the composition of the sub-national parliaments but also because of the “safeguard 
clause” ensuring that “at least one seat [in the Bundesrat] must fall to the party having the second largest number of 
seats in a Provincial Parliament” (Articles 34 and 35). This structural tie is mitigated by the fact that it is allowed, 
but not due, that the members of the Federal Council are members of sub-national parliaments and because elected 
Senators do not represent the Landtag interests in Bundesrat as long as they respond to the needs of parliamentary 
group to which they belong. Conversely, an election of Senators on regional basis can favor it (see A. D’ATENA, 
Finalmente un Senato “federale”, available at www.issirfa.it). Hence, there is a parliamentary and political 
representativeness of the Länder in the Federal Council; in this regard, the Bundesrat reflects more a political 
composition rather than a purely territorial one (See F. PALERMO, Il federalismo austriaco: un cantiere sempre aperto, 
available at www.issirfa.it.). 
39 Article 51(3), GG. See R.L. BORTHWICK, Methods of Composition of Second Chambers, in N.D.J. BALDWIN – D. 
SHEIL (eds.), Second Chambers, London, 2001, p. 22; F. PALERMO – J. WOELK, Germania, Bologna, 2006, p. 31. 
See also F. PALERMO, Germania e Austria: modelli federali e bicamerali a confronto. Due ordinamenti in evoluzione tra 
cooperazione, integrazione e ruolo delle seconde camere, Trento, 1997; M. KOTZUR, Federalism and Bicameralism - The German 
« Bundesrat » (Federal Council) as an Atypical Model, in J. LUTHER – P. PASSAGLIA – R. TARCHI (eds.), A World 
of Second Chamber. Handbook for Constitutional Studies on Bicameralism, Milano, 2006, pp. 257-292. 
40 W. PATZELT, The Very Federal House: The German Bundesrat, in S. PATTERSON – A. MUGHAN (eds.), Senates: 
Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, Cleveland, 1999, pp. 59-92. 
41 See F. PALERMO – M. NICOLINI, Bicameralismo, op.cit., pp. 154-155, 234. 
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rooted in the democratic principle and popular sovereignty, that legitimizes the competences and powers 
of the upper houses in exercising the will of the State.42 
The representation of various sub-national interests could motivate the design of legislative institutions. 
The framework of ‘political-territorial’ model have to be considered alongside mechanisms of 
differentiation based on constituencies and electoral formulas.43 Mechanisms of Senators’ designation 
combined with the principle of pluralism offer a consistent pattern that complies with the purposes of 
bicameralism, namely the Upper House, besides the oppositional function with respect to any ‘drift’ of 
the Lower House, ensures the respect of the State components’ identities. Thus, while pluralism derives 
from popular sovereignty echoed in an autonomous body of representation and participation, different 
selection criteria of the Second Chamber components have proven to be the most appropriate to 
integrate the general representation and to attain the effective representation of pluralism in decision-
making bodies. 
Though many bicameral systems structure their upper houses around representation of sub-national 
components, this focus was diminished by including representatives of other various interests. For 
instance, in Italy and France, the Senate is elected not only on a territorial basis: the Constitution reserves 
                                                          
42 See G. VOLPI, Autonomia locale e garantismo. Le separazione delle competenze tra Stato e Regioni, Milano, 1972, p. 113. 
43 The French Senate, as an institution where the general political representation is integrated by the national 
sovereignty through the particular territorial decentralization of the Nation, is indirectly elected through a voting 
system that combines majority rule with the proportionality representation, by grands électeurs (including regional 
councilors, department councilors, mayors, city councilors in large towns, and members of the National Assembly), 
ensuring the representation of the territorial communities of the Republic constitutionally recognized (Articles 
24(3) and 74). See F. PALERMO – M. NICOLINI, Bicameralismo, op.cit., p. 95; P. ARDANT – B. MATTHIEU, 
Institutions politique et droit constitutionelle, Paris, 2009, pp. 549-550. Conversely, at least, until the new reform will enter 
into force (on the new Italian Senate, see e.g. P. PASSAGLIA, Qualche considerazione sulla disciplina della composizione 
del Senato contenuta nel progetto di revisione costituzionale in corso di approvazione, in Osservatoriosullefonti.it, n..3/2014) the 
Senate is directly elected by the sub-national communities on a proportional representation basis. In Italian legal 
system, the election of the Senate is only tied to the regional organization of the State (Article 57; see e.g. T. 
MARTINES, Il Senato eletto “a base regionale”, sub Article 57, in G. BRACA (cur.), Commentario della Costituzione. Le 
Camere, Bologna-Roma, 1984, pp. 90 ss) because territorial entities are seen as constituencies for the purpose of 
allocating seats and introduce only an “organizational criteria” differentiating the representation as regards the 
Chamber of Deputies. Spain implements a mixed system of direct and indirect election. The Senate reflects the 
territorial organization of the (indivisible) popular sovereignty (see P. FÉRNANDEZ SEGADO, Article 69, in O. 
ALZAGA VILLAAMIL (dir.), Comentarios a la Constitución española de 1978. Tomo VI. Articulos 66 a 80, Madrid, 1998, 
p. 201). There are two types of Senators: constituent units’ Senators (legislative assemblies of the Autonomous 
Communities nominate one Senator and a further Senator for each million inhabitants in their respective territories, 
guaranteeing adequate proportional representation (Article 69(2), (3) and (4)); and provincial Senators (elected by 
popular vote in each peninsular and insular provinces, and cities of Ceuta and Melilla (Article 69(5)). The Spanish 
bicameralism envisages political, ethnic-linguistic and territorial cleavages. Considering that each political party is 
spread also on territorial basis, giving voice to the linguistic and ethnic communities. See E. AJA, El Estado 
Autonomico. Federalismo y hechos diferenciales, Madrid, 2003; J.M. CASTELLÀ ANDREU, The Spanish Senate after 28 
years of constitutional experiences, in J. LUTHER – P. PASSAGLIA – R. TARCHI (eds.), A World, op.cit., pp. 859-910. 
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some seats to overseas citizens.44 Moreover, Italian Senate also contains permanent (non-elected) 
members: the Constitution allows each President of the Republic to appoint up to five senators who have 
live tenure "for outstanding patriotic merits in the social, scientific, artistic or literary field. Former 
Presidents of the Republic are ex officio senators for life”.45 Thus, these upper houses are not exclusively 
dedicated to sub-national interests, and the designation method generally appears to be ineffective at 
including sub-national units, especially in those systems in which the structure of the Second Chamber is 
compromised by the presence of other interests. 
 
3.2. Consent Paradigm 
Mechanisms for approval of constitutional changes by upper houses as representatives of sub-national 
units vary, but no European legal system states a model similar to Swiss Cantons’ consent.46 The 
European sub-nationalism is characterized by the involvement of the sub-national communities in the 
constitutional amendment process through the Upper House. Both federal47 and non-federal ‘territorial’48 
systems incorporate sub-national entities into constitutional amendment process by requiring them or 
their representative institutions directly deliberate and ratify proposed amendments. In this perspective, 
they participate in constitutional change processes carrying by a supermajority the amendments proposed.  
                                                          
44 If in Italy the overseas constituencies are represented in both chambers, in French, citizens living outside the 
Republic are represented and elected only in the Senate. 
45 Article 59(2), Italian Const. The new reform preserves the nomination of five Senators for seven-year terms by 
the President of the Republic. There is no reference to the former Presidents of the Republic as permanent 
members on the Senate. 
46 Article 195, Swiss Const.: “The totally or partly revised Federal Constitution comes into force when it is approved 
by the People and the Cantons”. Thus, the legitimacy derives from the Swiss people as a whole and Swiss Cantons 
as constituent units and the amendment rules reproduce this framework establishing a ratification method based 
on both nation-wide referendum and the Cantons. (Article 140 (a)). 
47 See e.g. N. ARONEY, op.cit., p. 326. German and Austrian amendments rules provide for complicity of both 
political actors with legislative competences – one of which represents the constituent units (Bundesrat) –, and the 
same procedure required for simple federal laws for which it is necessary the consent of both legislative chambers. 
The only difference consists of the two-thirds majority requested for the approval of amendments (Germany, 
Article 79(2). In Austria, the Constitution expressly states that the approval must be imparted in the presence of 
structural (at least half the members) and deliberative quorums (two-thirds majority of the votes cast (Article 44(2)). 
Moreover, the Austrian Constitution specifies that the laws relating to the rights of the Federal Council should 
also obtain in Federal Council the majority of the representatives from at least four provinces has approved the 
amendment (Article 35(4)). There is one exception: the presence of at least one third of the members and an 
absolute majority of the votes cast is requisite for a resolution by the Federal Council in case of an “ordinary” 
revision. In Belgian system the third step of the amendment process represents the revision stricto sensu and only 
this is subject to a two-thirds majority of the new elected chambers. The first step of the process, namely the 
Declaration of revision, should be approved by an absolute majority of votes in each chamber. 
48 Two-thirds majority is requested in Italy, Spain, and Belgium. In Spain, bills on constitutional amendment must 
be approved by a majority of three-fifths of the members of each House (Article 167(1)). In France, the 
Government Bill not submitted to referendum shall be approved by a three-fifths majority of the Parliament 
convened in Congress (Article 89(2)). 
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Different voting thresholds are established in some systems, such as Germany49 and Spain50, where, if the 
requested two-thirds majorities are not reached, a joint commission of the legislative chambers could be 
convened in order to achieve a unanimous consent on the text of the law amending the constitution. If 
in Germany the ‘Joint Committee’ demanded by Bundesrat is optional, in Spain, a ‘Joint Commission of 
Deputies and Senators’ is mandatory if the proposed amendments do not obtained the approval by a 
majority of three-fifths of the members of each national legislative chamber. The new common text 
should be approved by an absolute majority of the members of the Senate and by two-thirds majority of 
the Congress.  
The consent of the Upper House could not reflect the communities’ will because of their obsolete 
interests whether this legislative branch was formed as a result of the direct election of the territories’ 
representatives. Whether this chamber is composed of representatives appointed by sub-national 
legislatures, the approval of constitutional amendments corresponds more strongly to the consent of sub-
national units because of the narrower approach to the community and its interests. Hence, the approval 
of amendments by the same supermajorities in both chambers implies a broad consensus at the political 
level or a sort of collaboration among government majority and opposition forces, which results more 
evident as much as altered is – at the expense of the same governing majority – the composition of the 
Upper House.51 
In any case, the sub-national components’ will, expressed through their representation in the Upper 
House, risks to be overcome and overturned by the new chamber (in those systems which provide for 
the dissolution of the chambers52) or by the people itself (when a further consent through a popular 
referendum is required 53) 
Moreover, supermajority approval, higher quorum requirements or delays due to the establishment of a 
joint commission complicate formal amendments and makes constitutions more difficult to amend. 
It is also difficult to assess a more complex method of direct inclusion in the constitutional amendments 
process, as in Switzerland, which seems to support its effectiveness at including sub-national units.54 This 
unique example suggests that requiring sub-national units to directly endorse amendments can be a 
particularly potent method of including sub-national units because provides them with an effective means 
of protecting their interests through the ‘negative’ action of vetoing amendments endorsed by national 
                                                          
49 Article 77(2), GG. 
50 Article 167(1), Spanish Const. 
51 Especially in Germany, where Bundesrat became an opposition “tool” in order to prevent government action 
within parliamentary majority–executive axis. See F. PALERMO – M. NICOLINI, Bicameralismo, op.cit., p. 234. 
52 Belgium, Spain. 
53 Austria, Spain, Italy and France. 
54 See W.S. LIVINGSTON, Federalism and Constitutional Change, London, 1956, pp. 234-237; 312-313. 
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institutions (and even sometimes popular national majorities). This suggests a degree of independent 
judgment by the sub-national communities that presumably reflects their interests not apprehended by 
national institutions.  
 
3.3. Structural Paradigm 
In order to understand the degree of involvement of the second chambers in the constitutional 
amendment process, it is necessary to shape the framework of constitutional changes and to distinguish 
diverse revision formulas embedded in the written democratic constitutions.  
Formal constitutional changes must be considered in the light of fundamental conceptual distinction 
between ‘amendment’ and ‘revision’ pursuant to which different procedures are applied to amend or 
revise the constitutional text. From this point of view, different conceptual meanings allow to assess the 
classical distinction between total and partial revision; but not always the conceptual distinction could be 
found in the constitutional text, which makes difficult to distinguish between two forms of revisions55 or 
to identify, especially, a total revision through a constitutional pre-ordained procedure as long as this can 
only take place in the presence of a revolution.56  
Thus, this distinction allows to (re)evaluate the different typologies of revisions and mechanisms of 
constitutional changes and use a diverse taxonomy.  
First, within the classical framework of formal constitutional revisions, different degrees of rigidity are 
outlined in some constitutions that adopt a distinction between formal amendment, as ‘normal revision’ 
which aims to modify or integrate parts or single provisions of the constitutions, and constitutional 
revision, as ‘qualified revision’ implemented in order to totally change the constitutional text.57 For instance, 
Spanish Constitution states both the normal procedure, related to the substantial reform of some parts 
of the constitution, and the special one, concerning total revisions of the constitutional text or partial 
revision of provisions affecting fundamental rights and public liberties.58  
                                                          
55 P. BISCARETTI DI RUFFIA, Introduzione al diritto costituzionale comparato: le "forme di Stato" e le "forme di governo", 
le costituzioni moderne, Milano, 1984, p. 631. See also R. ALBERT, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, in 
Wake Forest L. Rev.,  n. 94/2014, p. 930. 
56 See C. MORTATI, Concetto, limiti e procedimento della revisione costituzionale, in Riv. Trim. di dir. pubb., n. 58/1952; P. 
BARILE, La revisione della Costituzione, in P. CALAMANDREI – A. LEVI (dir.), Commentario sistematico alla 
Costituzione italiana, Vol. 2, Firenze, 1950, p. 472. See also J. LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, Indianapolis, 
1980, sect. 226-227. 
57 See M.P. VIVIANI SCHLEIN, Rigidità e flessibilità costituzionale, in AA.VV., Studi in onore di Paolo Biscaretti di Ruffia, 
Vol. 2, Milano, 1987, p. 1376; S. BONFIGLIO, Sulla rigidità delle Costituzioni. Il dibattito italiano e la prospettiva 
comparata, in Dir. Pubb,, n. 1/2015, p. 109. 
58 Article 168, Spanish Const. A clear distinction between total and partial revision is contained also in Austrian 
Constitution (Article 44(3), B-VG refers to total revision; Articles 44(2) and 35(4), B-VG refers to partial revisions) 
and Swiss Constitution (Article 193 regarding total revision; Article 194 regarding partial revision). 
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Second, conceptual distinction between total and partial revision is not always entrenched in the 
constitutional text. It does not mean that there is not indentified the type of revision in order to perform 
a constitutional change according to the specific purpose of the designated procedure; the text leaves 
simply unstated this distinction. If Spanish, Austrian, and Swiss constitutions insist on the explicit 
recognition of the two procedures of constitutional revision, other constitutions, such as Germany, 
Belgium, Italy or France, leave unspecified this distinction with the risk that their implicit recognition make 
difficult to identify the constitutional change subject, as well as compromise the related consequences 
and outcomes. 
Following Richard Albert’s approach,59 it could be embedded also the taxonomy of formal amendments 
based on the content of constitutional text related to the Upper House involvement and the range of 
constitutional provisions open to formal amendments by those aforementioned procedures: a) 
comprehensive revision, according to which all amendable provisions are susceptible to amendment by both 
types of revision requiring the consent of Upper House (Germany, France, Italy and Belgium); b) restricted 
revision, under which to each amendable provision corresponds one of designated procedure requiring the 
approval of Upper House (Spain); and c) exceptional revision, pursuant to which only one available 
procedure is applied to a specific amendable provision (or a set of related provisions) affecting the 
competences of the Upper House (Austria). 
Furthermore, from a pure textual perspective, rules of formal constitutional amendments (including those 
relating to the involvement of Upper House) are contained in one or more provisions; thus, the 
constitutional text can be categorized in: i) complete, where the rules are contained in a Part or Title of the 
constitution unifying the rules of more articles, and sufficiently comprehensive to indentify the paths of 
amendments procedure (Spain, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland60); ii) substantive, pursuant to which the 
procedure is restricted to only one article, quite comprehensible of paths to be followed (France, 
Germany61); iii) discrete, where the provisions are entailed in different parts of the constitutional text and 
indicate for each of them one specific procedure (Austria62).  
 
3.4. Procedural Paradigm 
Written constitutions embed different procedures available to formally amend them: first, a single-path 
procedure, applied to all amendable provisions and which requires to Upper House to vote in only one 
                                                          
59 See R. ALBERT, op.cit., pp. 936-948. 
60 Part X, Articles 166-169, Spanish Const.; Title VI, Sec. II, Articles 138-139, Italian Const.; Title VIII, Articles 
195-198, Belgian Const.; Title VI, Articles 192-195, Title VI, Articles 192-195, Swiss Const. 
61 Article 89, French Const.; Article 79, GG. 
62 Article 44(3), B-VG refers to total revision; Article 35(4), B-VG regarding partial revision. 
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session63; second, double-path procedure, pursuant to which a single-path procedure is integrated by a 
referendum64, or according to which formal amendments are adopted by Upper House after two 
successive divided debates65; and finally, multi-path procedure, featuring an additional consent by 
referendum, no matter if this possibility is an eventually alternative when the legislatives chambers do not 
reach the necessary supermajorities on the amendments proposed (optional referendum)66, or if this tool 
is constitutionalized as a method of formal amendments procedure (mandatory referendum).67  
In federal and non-federal ‘territorial’ systems, the need to protect the constitutional rigidity and the 
division of powers is bound up with the representation and participation of sub-national units to the 
constitutional review process.68 Formal amendment rules laid down by the constitutions provide for 
another paradigm related to the drivers of constitutional change (i.e. in this particular analysis, upper 
houses and sub-national units).69 This allows for some important observations.  
First. The power of sub-national communities to initiate an amendment process is normally exercised 
through the Upper House. Evidently, upper houses favor the indirect participation of the sub-national 
units to the constitutional amendment process. Nonetheless, a few systems allow them to directly70 
                                                          
63 Germany (Article 79); Austria (Article 44(3), if, in case of partial revision, one third of the. members of the 
Federal Council or the National Council do not demand for a referendum); France (Article 89(2)). 
64 Austria (Article 44(2) and (3); Article 35(4)); France (Article 89(1)). 
65 In Italy, the amendments proposed shall be adopted by each House after two successive debates at intervals of 
not less than three months (Article 138(1)). The constitutions of Belgium (Article 195) and Spain (Article 168) 
impose electoral preconditions upon formal amendments rules, requiring dissolution of the chambers and 
successive votes separated by the election of the new chambers which must ratify the decision and proceed to 
examine the new constitutional text.  
66 Within certain time limits, Senators, group of Senators or sub-national legislatures may demand to submit the 
approved amendments to a referendum (Article 138(2) Italian Const.; Article 167(3), Spanish Const.)  
67 Spain (Article 168);  
68 N. ARONEY, op.cit., p. 326. 
69 For a general classification of the formal (and informal) amendments processes based on the drivers of 
constitutional change, see C. FUSARO – D. OLIVER, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Change, in C. FUSARO – 
D. OLIVER (eds.), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study, Oxford, 2011, pp. 405-433. 
70 The sub-national units do not exactly propose directly themselves an amendment; actually, a group of them act 
as a “unique body”.  
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initiative constitutional amendments.71 Such constitutional arrangements72 prevent revisions unilaterally 
provided by the central government73 and legitimate the equal participation of both chambers in the 
constitutional amendment processes.74 In any case, direct inclusion device is rare because, actually, it 
divides the amendment power between vertical levels of government, determining, in their favor, a 
further guarantee, namely the constitutional rigidity.75 However, this method for including sub-national 
units is limited by the simple fact that no system allows sub-national units to adopt amendments without 
subsequent approval by the national legislature and/or a referendum. Furthermore, a more practical 
limitation is the difficulty of coordinating amendment proposals between multiple sub-national units that 
have to act as a ‘unique entity’.  
Second. There are some exceptions to this principle of equal participation of both chambers to 
constitutional revisions: a) on the one hand, in order to ‘safeguard’ the federal arrangements, amendment 
rules are structured by giving sub-nation al units strong veto powers76; on the other, upper houses’ 
objection can be overcome by the lower houses; b) while, on the one hand, a constitutional revision 
becomes effective also if the houses approve the amendments by different majorities77; on the other, joint 
commissions may be convened in order to reach an agreement between the chambers on the amendments 
proposed.78  
                                                          
71 There is some variety in how sub-national units can initiate amendments. Spanish sub-national communities, 
through their legislatures, can initiate a national amendment process but with some important limitations (Articles 
87 and 166). To them it is only recognized the opportunity to urge the Government to adopt a bill or to remit to 
the Congressional Steering Committee a proposal and to form a delegation of up to three members, appointed to 
defend the proposal before the House. In any way, this initiative, being merely a proposal, does not require the 
Govern to submit a draft reform to the Cortes. The position of the Autonomous Communities can be compared 
to that of individual parliamentarians, so as to qualify a limited initiative. In Spain, in fact, although lawmakers of 
the Autonomous Communities have the right to propose legislative amendments, the passage of these amendments 
can be exclusively through the Cortes Generales. Thus, there are not effective forms of participation in the 
constitutional review by the subjects of territorial pluralism. The Italian Constitution does not expressly state the 
bodies which can initiate a constitutional amendment process but legal scholarship considers that the power to 
propose a constitutional revision is extended to the same bodies with power to initiate ordinary legislation. So, 
pursuant to Article 71, laws amending the Constitution could “be introduced by the Government, by a member 
of Parliament and by those entities and bodies [constitutionally] empowered.”  
72 See C.J. FRIEDRICH, op.cit., p. 295. 
73 T. GROPPI, Federalismo e revisione costituzionale, in F. PALERMO (cur.), La «manutenzione» costituzionale, Padova, 
2007, p. 25.  
74 F. PALERMO – M. NICOLINI, Bicameralismo, op.cit., p. 166. 
75 A.V. DICEY, Introduction to the Study of the Law and the Constitutions, London, 1885, pp. 142-145. 
76 Austria and Germany. 
77 Spain (Article 167(2); Austria (Article 44(1) and 37(1)).  
78 Spain (Article 167(a)); Germany (Article 77(2)). In France, it could not be convened a joint commission in order 
to achieve a common consent on the proposed amendments as for the ordinary laws, but when the President of 
the Republic decides to submit constitutional amendments to Parliament, this is convened in joint session (Article 
89(2)).  
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Finally, the alternative use of nation-wide referenda to amend national constitutions is a ‘threat’ to bypass 
the legislature. The use of this tool envisages a further limitation because it could reverse the entire 
process through a rejection of the amendments proposed and undermine the consistency of the 
communities’ representative chamber.79 Moreover, there are only popular referendums and this stress a 
limitation because in this way sub-national communities do not have the opportunity to participate 
directly in the process in order to achieve a greater consensus in favor of the amendments or reject them 
completely. 
 
3.5. Normative Paradigm 
The recognized role of the territorial components in the constitutions’ ‘life’ through their involvement 
(even if indirect) into constitutional changes help us to assess the appropriateness of revision formulas 
both with regard to the amendability and the permanent validity of the constitutional texts. Evidently 
that any formal amendment requirement for having a real aggravating effect, should be established by a 
higher source of law, namely the constitution or constitutional norms. Thus, through this method will be 
sought to construct a normative framework on the basis of hierarchical constitutional importance of the 
norms employed in the amendment processes and gradually structure the constitutional rigidity.  
Formal amendment procedures represent the guarantee of the constitutional framework and ensure the 
‘essence’ of legal systems80 in which the Constitution is the supreme norm and any constitutional change 
has to preserve its nature. It is the supremacy of the constitution81 – as document solemnly enacted82 – 
above ordinary law that confirms its rigidity, and the constitutional rigidity that corresponds to a special 
amendment procedure, aggravated respect to the ordinary one.83 Thus, constitutional revision is placed 
outside the realm of ordinary lawmaking.84 
                                                          
79 For instance, Italian amendment rules regarding the eventually referendum establish only the structural quorum; 
thus, amendments are passed if the law submitted to referendum is approved by a majority of valid votes. 
80 A. PACE, La causa della rigidità costituzionale, Padova, 1996, p. 90; T. GROPPI, Federalismo e costituzione: la revisione 
costituzionale negli stati federali, Milano, 2001, p. 133. 
81 Written form of a constitution concerns a fundamental law which pretends to be “supreme” respect to other 
norms not because of its nature but because of its claim to being as such resulting from the formal or substantive 
limits set up in it. See SANTI ROMANO, Il diritto pubblico italiano, Milano, 1998, p. 234; E. SIEYES, Opinione sulle 
attribuzioni e l’organizzazione del Giurì costituzionale proposta alla Convenzione nazionale il 2 termidoro anno III (1795), in E. 
SIEYES, Opere e testimonianze politiche, Tomo I, Vol. II, Milano, 1993, pp. 814-824. 
82 J. BRYCE, Flexible and Rigid Constitutions, in Studies of History and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, Oxford, 1901, p. 208. 
83 See. J. BRYCE, The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, London, 1889, p. 350; J. BRYCE, Flexible, op.ult.cit., pp. 153, 
203-210, 217-221.  
84 T. GINSBURG – Z. ELKINS – J. BLOUNT, Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, in Ann. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Sci., n. 5/2009, p. 206. 
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Formal constitutional amendment rules, distinguishing the ‘supreme’ law from ordinary law, imply certain 
specified exceptions to the legislative authority. In this event, a rigid constitution coincides to a limited 
constitution:85 limits imposed to the constitutional revision power can be justified on the grounds of “the 
principle of hierarchical differentiation of the formal constitutional law, which delivers varying degree of 
constitutional rigidity”.86  
First of all, as mentioned above, the different degrees of rigidity are outlined in consideration of different 
types of revision that render amendable, adaptable and modifiable under certain conditions the 
fundamental texts. A constitutional revision stricto sensu embedded the so-called formal (or normal) rigidity: 
if a constitution is susceptible to change, it can be changed only by that authority “superior to the 
authority of the other laws of the State” or by that special body, and “by a method different from that, 
whereby those laws are enacted or repealed”.87 Thus, the ‘normal’ rigidity is given by the amendable 
nature of the written text. Indeed, since the absolute immutability of the constitution is impossible to 
sustain and to pursue, the most suitable and efficient mechanism is that of the special amendment 
procedure by means of constitutional laws enacted by the proper organ for issuing legal norms.  
Facing the supremacy of the constitution, it occurs to highlight the superiority of the fundamental 
principles, confirmed by the recognition of formal and substantive limits to the constitutional revision 
power. In this perspective, a further degree of rigidity, in the sense of ‘increase rigidity’, should be 
considered. First, this concept is tied to that of substantive rigidity according to which fundamental 
principles stating the ‘core elements’ of the constitution88 are susceptible to resist to any ‘constitutional 
maintenance work’ or constitutional renewal, including that by European law.89 Second, this pattern 
becomes relevant in those constitutions which include reinforced amendment mechanisms related to 
specific matters for which it is not sufficient a normal revision procedure, and which stress the so-called 
intermediate rigidity.90  
Conversely, the ‘decrease rigidity’ refers to ‘other norms’, enclosing the same value and efficiency as 
formal constitutional laws, which diminish the impact and scope of the constitutional rigidity. These 
                                                          
85 See A. HAMILTON, Essay No. 78, in The Federalist Papers,  Penguin, 1987. 
86 G. DE VERGOTTINI, Diritto costituzionale comparato, Vol. I, VI ed., Padova, 2004, p. 130. 
87 J. BRYCE, Flexible, op.cit.,  pp.  151, 197. 
88 See M.P. VIVIANI SCHLEIN, Rigidità e flessibilità, op.cit., pp. 1367-1368. On unamendable constitutional values 
see C. SCHMITT, Théorie de la Constitution, Paris, 1993. 
89 Member States can uphold core elements of their constitutions that may not be override by the EU law by virtue 
of the Lisbon Treaty clause according to which Eu should respect the national identities of the Member States 
(Article 4(2), TUE). 
90 For instance, the substantial revision of Spanish Constitution (Article 168(1) related to fundamental principles, 
the Crown, rights and duties of citizens; the special revision of Austrian Constitution regarding election rules, 
eligibility preconditions, competences of Länders (Articles 35(4) and 44(2)); the so-called Italian “reinforced 
constitutional laws” concerning the creation of new Regions (Article 132).  
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norms endowed by passive force weakened the rigidity of the constitution because were not coming in 
force neither by a constituent process nor by an amendment procedure, but are supposed to be amended 
through the same constitutional revision procedure.91 This explains, at the large extend, the variable rigidity 
according to which a norm equivalent to a formal constitutional law ‘deconstitutionalizes’ the ‘normal’ 
amendment procedure and can change the structure of the legal order.  
A more accurate identification of the degree of rigidity is correlated to the distinction between express and 
tacit revision. On the one hand, the constitutional rigidity – meant as the guarantee of the stability of the 
supreme legal order – would be best attained if the fundamental text specifies the appropriate source of 
law able to modify the constitution;92 on the other, implied revision involves constitutional changes by 
‘other constitutional laws’ that, nonetheless enacted by a special amendment procedure, are not included 
in the constitutional text, do not weighed on this because rest totally independent of it.93 Thus, 
constitutions’ durability can be affected by the flexibility and inclusiveness of its amendment rules.  
Finally, the constitutionalism beyond the Nation State jeopardizes the traditional methods of reading the 
constitutions and imposed to rethink mechanisms of constitutional change as reaction to extra-national 
challenges. A specialized rigidity has to be address in those legal systems, such as Italy, in which mandatory 
                                                          
91 See German federal laws regarding new delimitation of the federal territory as stated by the Article 29; provisions 
of some Italian Statutes of special regions can be amended also by an ordinary law and are subject to advisory 
opinion of the regional bodies (Article 54(2) Statute of Sardegna; Article 103(3), Statute of Trentino-Alto Adige, 
Article 63(3), Statute of Friuli-Venezia Giulia); French organic laws regarding the Senate should obtain the consent 
of this body (Article 46(4)) or those amending the Statute of overseas communities need the consent of their 
Deliberative Assembly (Article 74(2)); Spanish organic laws relating to the implementation of fundamental rights 
and public liberties and those approving the Statutes of Autonomy (Article 81), as well as the framework acts on 
self-governing of Autonomous Communities (Article 150(3)); the Belgian special laws which, pursuant to Article 
4(3), can change and correct the boundaries of the four linguistic regions only if “passed by a majority of the votes 
cast in each linguistic group in each House, on condition that a majority of the members of each group is present 
and provided that the total number of votes in favor that are cast in the two linguistic groups is equal to at least 
two-thirds of the votes cast”. In these cases, the veto of the Second Chamber or of the sub-national components 
could not be overcome. 
92 Pursuant to Article 79(1), German “Basic Law may be amended only by a law expressly amending or 
supplementing its text”. The Belgian federal law amending the constitutions has to contain the nomen iuris, that is 
a declaration regarding reasons to revise such constitutional provision (Article 195(1)). 
93 Article 138 It. Const. does not make a clear distinction among revision laws and formal constitutional laws, even 
if part of legal scholarship considers that the revision laws modify or supplement the constitutional text. See M.P. 
VIVIANI SCHLEIN, Rigidità e flessibilità, op.cit., p. 1381. Also in the Austrian legal system the denomination of 
“constitutional law” to create a constitutional provision that does not necessarily have to be incorporated into the 
core document has paved the way for the enactment of numerous constitutional laws and even constitutional 
provisions entrenched in simple laws, transforming this constitution in one of the most flexible constitutions of 
the world. See M. STELZER, Constitutional change in Austria, in X. CONTIADES (ed.), Engineering Constitutional 
Change: A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and the USA., London-New York, 2013, pp. 21-22. Implicit 
revision can occur also by the Declaration of revision used in Belgian system. See C. BEHRENDT, The process of 
constitutional amendment in Belgium, in X. CONTIADES (ed.), op.cit., p. 39. 
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provisions deriving from EU law and international law become part of the constitutional framework94 
and undermine the supremacy of the constitution. The Constitution is not anymore the ‘supreme’ norm 
of the domestic constitutional order as long as ‘supra-constitutional’ norms are binding, limit the 
sovereign power of the states, and determine the content of internal law disapplying national norms in 
contrast to them (provided that do not include fundamental principles or recognize inviolable human 
rights95). On the one hand, the rigidity seems to be mitigated by virtue of the international norms, 
especially of the supranational norms, and, on the other, explains its degree and differentiated (or 
specialized) nature because of those norms hieratically placed between superordinate and subordinate 
laws, and for which is requested a special and more complex procedure than that of the revision.96  
There is not only one category of constitutional rigidity, nor could it be structured, beyond a certain limit, 
the concept of rigidity. The criterion used to assess a higher or lower rank of the related source of law 
falls on the simplicity or complexity of the procedure it takes to create and/or amend the constitutional 
norms. Moreover, the degree of difficulty of the amendment process is linked to degrees of protection 
that political forces, in power at a given historical moment, had wanted to assign to the constitutional 
text.97 No formal rule can entirely guarantee the essence and spirit of the constitution: not necessarily a 
more complex amendment procedure designed to ensure the highest degree of constitutional 
unalterability will lead to greater stability of the constitutions. The lack of direct participation of the sub-
national units in the amendment processes favors the ordinary legislation instead of a formal 
constitutional amendment procedure, and methods of subnational inclusion through upper houses in 
amendment procedures may not frustrate constitutional flexibility. 
 
3.6. Amendability Paradigm 
As mention above, constitutional changes are very closely linked to the amendable nature of the 
provisions. Besides procedural prerequisites, amendment rules specifies what is subject to or immune 
from the formal amendment.  
                                                          
94 Article 117(1), It. Const.: “Legislative powers shall be vested in the State and the Regions in compliance with 
the Constitution and with the constraints deriving from EU legislation and international obligations.” 
95 See M. CARTABIA (cur.), I diritti in azione. Universalità e pluralismo dei diritti fondamentali nelle Corti europee, Bologna, 
2007), p. 57 (distinguishing a sort of «inverted primauté» according to which it is denied - also following the 
"communitarization" of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - the primacy of the fundamental rights of the Union 
with respect to the same guarantees ensured by the national constitutions). 
96 M.P. VIVIANI SCHLEIN, Il caso svizzero: una revisione continua, in F. PALERMO (cur.), La «manutenzione», op.cit., 
pp. 386-387. 
97 S. BONFIGLIO, Sulla rigidità, op.cit., p. 118. 
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While upper houses representing sub-national components are included in the amendment processes 
with respect to any amendable subject-matter, direct sub-national units’ involvement is limited to certain 
issues, usually related to their authority, jurisdiction, and territory. Spain’s Constitution requires sub-
national involvement regarding any proposals to create a new Comunidad Autónoma (considering that a 
federation of Autonomous Communities is strictly prohibited98), to amend provisions addressing self-
government.99 Further, it requires sub-national involvement in proposals to amend tax provisions100 or 
provisions regarding State service to culture101. Also, in Italy, a merger between existing Regions or the 
creation of new sub-national units having a minimum of one million inhabitants102 may trigger sub-
national involvement: the territory of an Italian Region can be modified and the resulting territorial 
alteration has consequences on the representation of the sub-national units in the national legislature. 
Conversely, the German Basic Law strictly prohibits the amendments affecting the division of the 
Federation into Länder or their participation on principle in the legislative process even if the request 
came from other Länder.103 Thus, only a new constituent power may overcome this provision.104 
Subject-matter triggers have entrenched exceptional thresholds to federal-reinforcing function. In some 
systems, in order to safeguard federalism, sub-national units have to directly approve the proposed 
amendment, either through their legislatures represented in the Upper House or referendum. In Austria, 
a formal amendment thresholds is established in respect of special provisions. Hence, amendments 
affecting the legislative or executive authority of the Länder trigger a supermajority requirement in the 
Bundestrat, or those stressing election and representation prerequisites of the Bundestrat trigger an 
                                                          
98 Article 145(1), Spanish Const. 
99 Article 143, Spanish Const. 
100 Article 133(2), Spanish Const. Moreover, Article 87(2) establishes that “[t]he Assemblies of the Autonomous 
Communities may […] refer a non-governmental bill [which involves an increase in credits or a decrease in budget 
revenue, see Article 133(6)] to the Congressional Steering Committee and to delegate a maximum of three 
Assembly members to defend it.” 
101 Article 149(2), Spanish Const.:“Without prejudice to the jurisdiction which may be assumed by the Autonomous 
Communities, the State shall consider the promotion of culture a duty and an essential function and shall facilitate 
cultural communication between the Autonomous Communities, in collaboration with them.” 
102 Article 132, Italian Const.: “By a constitutional law, after consultation with the Regional Councils, a merger 
between existing Regions or the creation of new Regions having a minimum of one million inhabitants may be 
agreed, when such request has been made by a number of Municipal Councils representing not less than one- third 
of the populations involved, and the request has been approved by referendum by a majority of said populations. 
The Provinces and Municipalities which request to be detached from a Region and incorporated in another may 
be allowed to do so, following a referendum and a law of the Republic, which obtains the majority of the 
populations of the Province or Provinces and of the Municipality or Municipalities concerned, and after having 
heard the Regional Councils.” 
103 Article 79(3), GG. 
104 J. WOELK, La Germania: tra numerose revisioni e nucleo essenziale protetto, in F. PALERMO (cur.), La «manutenzione», 
op.cit.,  p. 155. 
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additional majority requirement – that of Federal Council members representing at least four of nine sub-
national units. 105 
Obviously, subject-matter thresholds and exceptional involvement increase the authority of sub-national 
units in the amendment processes. However, degree of procedural difficulties arises under restricted and 
exceptional amendment rules governing subject-matters linked to constitutional values. On the one hand, 
in those systems in which the constitution marked the boundary between amendment and revision, this 
distinction may be exploited to express amending power vis-à-vis the constitutional values – whether the 
constitutional text sets out106 or leaves unstated these specific rights and fundamental principles.107 On 
the other, subject-matter triggers combine with constitutional values lead to a constitutional hierarchy of 
thresholds that culminate with the unamendability of certain basic principles and affirmation of 
‘entrenched clauses’.108  
As degree of procedural difficulty arises under restricted and exceptional amendment framework, the 
subject-matter thresholds assigned to some provisions likewise make difficult and challenge the 
amendment process. Especially, when formal amendment mechanisms involve sub-national units, 
increase rigidity becomes relevant. Though, this pattern is useful for channelizing political actors towards 
the most appropriate route for formal amendment in order to avoid the trap of an ‘unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment’.  
 
4. Ambassadorial Paradigm and Amendment Rules in the European Constitutional Framework 
In the European milieu, Member States are the ‘national units’ within the supranational framework. This 
part describes the peculiar European constitutional framework in which the ‘national units’ are 
represented, and then, starting from the aforementioned national paradigms, defines the contemporary 
                                                          
105 Articles 44(2) and 35(4), B-VG. See A. GAMPER, Legislative and Executive Government in Austria, Wien, 2004. 
106 Article 168, Spanish Const. 
107 An unstated identification of constitutional principles makes room for interpretation: according to Austrian 
scholars and Constitutional Court the constitution is ‘totally revised’ whenever principles of the constitution, such 
as the democratic principle, the federal principle or the principle of Rechtsstaat are amended or seriously affected. 
See M. STELZER, op.cit., p. 24; A. GAMPER, Revisione e “manutenzione” della costituzione austriaca, in F. PALERMO 
(cur.), La «manutenzione», op cit., pp. 65-68; G. AVOLIO – C. ZWILLING, Percorsi alternativi alla revisione costituzionale 
in Germania ed Austria. Il rischio dell’empasse tra bilancio e progetto, in DPCE, n. 1/2006, pp. 3-19.  
108 The content of unamendable provisions varies from the form and system of government, political and 
governmental structure, to basic rights. See Article 79(3), GG: Article 139, It. Const.; Article 89(5), French Const.; 
Articles 17, 18 and 25, Belgian Const. Cf. Y. ROZNAI, Unamendability and Genetic Code of the Constitution, in NY 
Working Paper , n. 15-13/2015.   
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supranational paradigm justifying the most suitable approach to including ‘national components’ in the 
process of ‘formal European constitutional change’109 both by their governments and by their legislators.  
 
4.1. The European Paradox: National Units within (No)State, (No)Constitution, (No)Upper 
House 
The ‘supranational bicameralism’ stands a forced conceptualization given that at European level neither 
exists a state structure nor bicameral principle is applied, as regards to the institutions. However, there 
are institutions that represent the EU ‘territorial’ interest. In fact, in the scholarship debate around the 
European federal nature,110 it is stressed that the potential evolution into a federal state should move 
towards the transformation of the Council in a real Second Federal Chamber that represents the Member 
States and counterbalances the chamber of general representation embodied in the European 
Parliament.111  
In the sense of ‘territorial’ representation in the European space, the Council is the consequent institution 
of the Europe des Patries as long as asserts a forum of the constitutive sovereignties, namely the Member 
States. Its evolution from an intergovernmental body to a supranational legislator of variable composition 
within a federal framework of ‘reversed bicameralism’112, votes’ unity as representatives of national 
executives, and use of weighted representation formula has rendered this institution similar to German 
Bundesrat,113 but it has not yet amounted to a European Upper House in the proper sense.114 
                                                          
109 I use this formula because as argued by Möllers, EU primary law has been ‘constitutionalized’ and ECJ has 
increasingly made use of what Von Bogdandy calls ‘constitutional semantics’. See C. MÖLLERS, Pouvoir Constituant 
– Contitution – Constitutionalisation, in A. VON BOGDANDY – J. BAST (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional 
Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2009, p. 195; A. VON BOGDANDY, Founding Principles of EU Law: A Theoretical and Doctrinal 
Sketch, in Eur. L. J., n. 16(2)/2010, p. 96. 
110 J.A. CAPORASO, The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?, in JCMS n. 
34/1996, pp. 29-52; T.A. BÖRZEL – T. RISSE, Who is Afraid of A European Federation? How to Constitutionalise a 
Multi-Level Governance System, in C. JOERGES – Y. MÉNY – J.H.H. WEILER (eds.), What kind of constitution for what 
kind of polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, Florence, 2000, pp. 45-60. 
111 P. PASSAGLIA, Suggestion to find a “Parliament” within the Institutional Organization of EU, in J. LUTHER – P. 
PASSAGLIA – R. TARCHI (eds.), A World, op.cit., p. 1085; K. LENAERTS, Federalism: Essential Concepts in evolution 
– the Case of the European Union, in Fordham Int’l L.J., n. 21(3)/1998, p. 763. 
112 T.O. HUEGLIN – A. FENNA, Comparative Federalism, op.cit., p. 203. 
113 T.O. HUEGLIN – A. FENNA, Comparative Federalism, op.ult.cit., p. 204. See also R. BIFULCO (cur.), Ordinamenti 
federali comparati. II. America Latina, India, Europa e Unione Europea, Torino, 2012, pp. 206-207, 212, 221.  
114 Despite the lack of textual denomination in this sense, constitutional scholarship held the thesis of the second 
Chamber of EU on the basis of explicit Treaty’s provisions concerning the legislative power (Articles 14(1) TEU 
and 16(1) and (8) TEU) , the ‘joint commission’ similar to national ones (Article 294(10) TFEU). In any case, it 
cannot be considered an Upper House stricto sensu because, from a structural outlook, it is devoid of a plenum, and 
of transparency in its work because of the ‘technical’ composition of members, receiving a binding mandate.  
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There is no doubt that it has been often attempted to frame the European Union on the basis of the 
conceptual comparison on statehood and to define it according to the existing forms of State.115 The 
extent to which exists a form of EU legal order is proportional to the degree of its constitutionalization, 
and this precisely because it is the existence of a constitution (and not necessarily the existence of a State) 
that allows the affirmation of a form of State.116 Accurately, the No-State form of European Union has 
allowed the genesis and gradually settlement of a European form of State in the absence of a constituent 
moment – functionally replaced, on the one hand, by the Member States’ amenability to the EU 
integration process (uti singoli or collectively through the Council of the European Union), and, on the 
other, by the development of the constitutional principles by the Court of Justice and progressively 
recognized by the national courts.117 
The European Union is not a State; it is qualified as a Federation of States118 in which the treaties corresponds 
to a Constitutional Charter of Union.119 The range of competences, the broad use of fundamental principles 
and values, and the binding force the Charter of fundamental rights are all recognized as elements that 
erect the EU treaties to a constitutional level.120 Thus, the Lisbon Treaty could be described as a quasi-
                                                          
115 See G.F. MANCINI, Europe: the Case of Statehood, in Eur. L. J., n. 4/1998, pp. 29-42. 
116 See M. SHAPIRO, Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, in S. Cal. L. Rev., n. 53/1979, pp. 537-542. 
117 F. PALERMO, La forma di Stato dell’Unione Europea. Per una storia costituzionale dell’integrazione sovranazionale, Padova, 
2005, pp. 81-83. 
118 R. SCHÜTZE, From dual to cooperative federalism. The Changing Structure of European Union, Oxford, 2009, pp. 52-
53; 69-73;  
119 J.H.H. WEILER, The Transformation of Europe, in J.H.H. WEILER, The Constitution of Europe: 'Do the New Clothes 
Have an Emperor?' and Other Essays on European Integration, Cambridge, 1999, p. 12. See ECJ judgment of 23 April 
1986, Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament, ECR 1986-4, at 1339; judgment of 23 March 
1993, Case C-314/91, Beate Weber v European Parliament, ECR 1993-1, at 1083, para. 8; ECJ judgment of 3 September 
2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P&C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 ECR I -06351, para. 281. But see the opinion 
of the German Constitutional Court in its Decision on the Treaty of Lisbon, Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), June 
30, 2009, 2 be 2/08, paras. 233, 235, available at www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ 
es20090630_2bve000208en.html, which insists that Europe is not at present a true federal State, and stating 
moreover that the German Constitution would prohibit any degree of integration going so far as to supplant “the 
constituent power of the Member States as the Masters of the Treaties.” In other words, in the view of the Court, 
the constituent power of the peoples of Europe remains within the national Member States; and at least in 
Germany it must remain so. 
120 The proclivity on drawing stark lines between “constitution” and “treaty” arise in the literature on federalism 
and, especially, in the context of the European Union. The conflation of these concepts amounts to an analytical 
sin: the “constitutional” status of the European treaties is hotly contested even in the courts, with a palpable 
linguistic divergence in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter ECJ) and the 
supreme courts of the Member States (see Kadi Case, para. 285). See also M. POIARES MADURO, The Importance 
of Being Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the Authority of Constitutionalism, in Int’l J. Const. L., n. 3/2005, 
p. 352 (insisting that “the choice of the legal form of a treaty, and the subjection of the text, for the most part, to 
the traditional mechanisms of treaty ratification make clear that we are not confronting a constitution in the 
classical sense”).  
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constitutional Treaty as long as contributes to establishing a sort of ‘material’ constitution;121 however, it 
is not yet a Constitution.122 
Nowadays, constitutional framework of European Union results from the existing multiple layers of 
authority. Thus, the European constitutional space is a constitutional mosaic compound of EU and 
Member States’ constitutions. In this event, EU is better defined as a ‘compound of constitutions’ 
(Verfassungsverbund) resulting from its primary law and constitutional law of Member States; hence, the 
principle of ‘constitutional composite’ has heterogeneous dimension (both supranational and national) 
in the context of European multilevel system (Mehrebenensystem).123  
  
4.2. Member States and Treaties’ Rules of Revision: Mechanisms and Rationales of Inclusion 
There is no doubt that EU can be characterized as a system of second chamber governance and entire 
institutional evolution is a response to the widely criticized ‘democratic deficit’ of the Union. The 
European system based on council governance could be explained by the intergovernmental (and 
supranational) background in which the Council of Ministers rests the supranational policy-maker which 
acts by a qualified majority voting, leaving the main role on Treaty changes to the European Council 
where the unanimity prevails. Additionally, governments of Member states (alongside European 
Parliament and Commission), as drivers of Treaty changes, may propose an amendment to the existing 
treaties and initiate the revision procedure submitting it to the Council, which then is transmitted to the 
European Council and notified to the national parliaments. Thus, from the representation outlook, national 
components’ delegate their representatives at EU level, who are toughly accountable to their States and 
who express the will of their governments.124 Since the nature of such members clearly resembles that of 
                                                          
121 M. ROSENFELD, The European Treaty - Constitution and Constitutional Identity: A View from America, in Int’l J. Const. 
L., n. 3/2005, pp. 317- 318. See also J.H.H. WEILER, On the Power of the Word: Europe’s Constitutional Iconography, in 
Int’l J. Const. L.. n- 3/2005, p. 174 (referring to the proposed EU Constitution as a “treaty masquerading as a 
constitution,” in the interest of impugning what he takes to be an empty gesture at formal constitutionalism). 
Weiler does, however, insist that the European Union is a constitutional entity in spite of the “constitutional” 
paucity of its formal instruments; materially speaking, “in its quotidian existence Europe is constitutional and 
accepted as such.” J.H.H. WEILER, op.ult.cit., p. 183.  
122 The denomination “Constitution” is reserved for only those treaties that establish a unitary sovereign power, 
reflecting the identity of a constituent (and in return reflexively constituted) demos; anything less remains a mere 
treaty-based organization among sovereign states. See J. ARATO, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional 
Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations, in Yale J. Int’l. L., n. 38/2013, p. 298.  
123 I. PERNICE, The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, in Colum. J. Eur. L.., n. 15(3)/2009, p. 373; 
N. LUPO, Parlamento Europeo e Parlamenti nazionali nella costituzione “composita” nell’UE: le diverse letture possibili, in 
Rivistaaic.it, n. 3/2014, p. 2; A. MANZELLA, L’identità costituzionale dell’Unione europea, in ID., Quaderno europeo. 
Dall’Euro all’Euro-crisi, Venezia, 2005, pp. 41-51 (referring to ‘union of constitutions’). 
124 Cf. H. WALLACE – F. RENSHAW, The Council of Ministers, Basingstoke, 2006; D. NAURIN, Representation in 
the Councils of the EU, in S. KROGER (ed.), Political Representation in the European Union. Democracy in a Time of Crisis, 
London-New York, 2014. 
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ambassadors, this paradigm could be described as an ambassadorial model within the post-modern executive 
federalism.125 
However, this ambassadorial solution was reinforced by institutionalization of the Convention and by 
the inclusion of national parliaments in the revision process. On the one hand, the Convention (which 
also provide for involvement of the national parliaments) assesses the legitimacy of the Treaty 
amendment process.126 The role of national parliaments in the ‘proper functioning’ of the European 
Union is considered in the Lisbon Treaty as an informing principle of European democracy. The national 
parliaments not only democratizes the Treaty revision process127 but also aim to control the European 
Council meetings.128  
In terms of federalism, the treaties’ rules governing the European amendment changes embed different 
and complex procedures which, in essence, continue with the tradition of intergovernmental agreement 
and unanimous consent (both within the European Council and within the ratification phase by all Member 
States as a precondition for the entry into force of the amended treaties) as long as the Member States 
would ultimately remain ‘Masters of the Treaties’ and have no intention to giving up their position.  
European Treaty amendments’ rules are enshrined into a consolidated (unified) document, and most 
precisely into only one and complete provision (Article 48 TEU) which provides for an explicit 
recognition of the procedures. In the matters of revision, Lisbon Treaty does not distinguish between 
total and partial revisions; better, it can be asserted the qualified nature of the treaties’ revision procedure 
as well as an exceptional and restricted treaties’ revision within the increase rigidity paradigm.  
From the structural and procedural perspectives, formal treaty revision framework enacted by the Lisbon 
Treaty entrenches four possible procedures – two ordinary revision procedures and two simplified revision 
procedures.129 This distinction produces, beyond the textual location of the single provisions, varying 
                                                          
125 J. HABERMAS, Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational Democracy is Necessary and 
How is it Possible, in Eur. L. J., n. 21(4)/2015, p. 546. 
126 See T. RISSE – M. KLEINE, Assessing the Legitimacy of EU’s Treaty Revision Methods, in JCMS, n. 45(3)/2007, pp. 
69-80. Cf. C. PINELLI, The Convention Method, in N. LUPO – C. FASONE (eds.), Interparliamentary Cooperation in 
the Composite European Constitution, Oxford, 2016, pp. 57-72;  
127 See M. URREA CORRES, The New Treaty Revision Procedure and the Entry into Force of the Constitutional Treaty, 
available at www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/ urreacorrespaper.pdf 
128 W. WESSELS – O. ROZENBER, The democratic and parliamentary control of the European Council and Eurozone 
summits, in Study of European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs 2013, available at www.institutdelors.eu. 
129 Article 48 TEU. See B. De Witte, Treaty Revision Procedures after Lisbon, in A. BIONDI – P. EECKHOUT – S. 
RIPLEY (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford, 2012, pp. 107-127; L.J. QUESADA, The Revisions Procedures of the 
Treaty, in H.-J. BLANKE – S. MANGIAMELI (eds.), The European Union after Lisbon, Berlin-Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 
323-342; K. GRANAT, Interparlamentary Cooperation and the Simplified Revision Procedures, in N. LUPO – C. FASONE, 
Interparliamentary op.cit., pp. 75-77 (describing only the simplified revision procedures); B. GUASTAFERRO, La 
partecipazione dei Parlamenti nazionali e del Parlamento europeo al procedimento di revisione dei trattati, in A. MANZELLA – 
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degrees among the different parts of the Treaty, depending on the procedure employed (more or less 
aggravated); this, along with a further problem of assessing the value and scope of the provisions 
approved by one or the other procedure, as well as resolving the inconsistencies between the different 
norms.130 In a nutshell, notwithstanding the unitariness of Lisbon Treaty131, its provisions were structured 
following the degrees of revision procedures instead of the boundaries between the two Treaties.  
Article 48(2-5) TEU sets forth the ordinary revision procedure with or without the formal integration of the 
Convention method.  
First, if, having consulted the European Parliament and the Commission, the European Council decides 
in favor of the proposal by simple majority, the President of the European Council will call for a 
Convention, which cannot adopt amendments; it can only propose them, by consensus, to an 
intergovernmental conference (hereinafter IGC). Although its composition – representatives of the 
national parliaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the European 
Parliament and of the Commission, the Convention's role is that of adopting ‘by consensus a 
recommendation’ which does not affect the formal power of Treaty negotiation and conclusion, 
entrusted to a conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States.  
Second, the European Council may propose revisions that should be decided directly by an IGC with 
any pluralistic involvement through the Convention, as long as the nature of the proposed revision does 
not justify the setting-up of it. 
The constitutional goals featured by ordinary revision procedure are twofold: on the one hand, the 
attempt to overcome to the unanimity rule through the requirement of a common accord on the 
proposed amendments and the ratification of that agreement by all Member States separately, in 
accordance with their own constitutional rules and requirements;132 on the other, the involvement of all 
                                                          
N. LUPO (cur.). Il sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale, Torino, 2014, pp. 185-194 (describing the procedures also from 
the perspective of EP). 
130 G. BUSIA, Revisione del Trattato, ammissione di nuovi Stati e recesso dall’Unione, in A. BASSANINI – G. TIBERI, Le 
nuove istituzioni europee. Commento al Trattato di Lisbona, Bologna, 2010, p. 404. 
131 Lisbon Treaty has reunified two treaties (even though formally they are distinct) stating that they have the same 
legal value (Article 1 TEU). 
132 B. DE WITTE, Treaty Revision in the European Union: Constitutional Change through International Law, in Netherland 
Yearbook Int’l L., n. 35/2004, p. 74 (explaining that the ratification guarantees the protection of the national 
principle of separation of powers which the governments cannot set aside). should be added that, on the basis of 
the tool at its disposal under Article 48(5), the Council can push the reluctant States which within two years after 
the signature of the treaty amending the Treaties have not ratified it, or encountered difficulties in proceeding with 
ratification, avoiding, in this way, their withdrawal or a ‘super enforced cooperation’ among the four-fifth countries 
that ratified it. See G. BUSIA, op.cit., pp. 407-408. 
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European institutions in the amendment process, for improving transparency and breaking of the 
‘diplomatic negotiations’ circuit’.133  
The rigidity caused by the national ratification phase of Treaty revision is precisely what the Lisbon Treaty 
sought to address by including, in Article 48(6-7) TEU, two simplified revision procedures for restricted classes 
of amendment, which are both characterized by the absence of Convention and formal ratifications. 
First. The simplified revision procedure laid down in Article 48(6) TEU, has a broader scope and regards 
amendments of Part Three of the TFEU relating to the Union policies and internal actions134, and subject 
to one major exception: provisions can be revised without increasing the competences conferred on the 
EU in the treaties; if so, the ordinary revision procedure will have to be used instead. This procedure do 
not provide for a Convention or an IGC; the amendment will be ‘adopted’ directly by the European 
Council acting unanimously. The Treaty itself gives no set role to national parliaments, but that decision 
will be subject to ‘approval’ by each Member State135) according to its own constitutional requirements 
that involve a consultation of the national parliament and a ‘positive approval’ vote by each parliament. 
As the procedure does not run out of European level, the simplified revision cannot be compared with 
a deconstitutionalization of treaties’ amendment process.136 
Second. The general passerelle procedure described in Article 48(7) TEU introduces a “genuine measure of 
flexibility” in Treaty amendment process,137 under which, the European Council (with a decision taken 
by unanimity and with the consent of the European Parliament) may remove the voting requirement 
from unanimity to qualified majority in all the areas and cases where the treaties continue to provide that 
the Council must act by unanimity138, or may introduce the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (i.e. co-
decision) in all the areas and cases in which the treaties still provide for a different, more 
intergovernmental, procedure. In other words, a further deepening of integration by making EU decision-
making less intergovernmental will, to some extent, be possible without the need for setting up an IGC 
and, above all, without the need for constitutional ratification of these changes by all the Member States 
separately.  
                                                          
133 P. CRAIG, The Lisbon Treaty, Revised Edition: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, Oxford, 2013, p. 438; T. 
CHRISTIANSEN – G FALKNER – K.E. JØRGENSEN, Theorizing EU treaty reform: beyond diplomacy and bargaining, 
in J. Eur. Public Policy, n. 9/2002, pp. 12-32. 
134 It does not cover the common foreign and security policy, external action or institutional matters. 
135 And here is the crucial difference with Article 48(7) even if it does not refer to a ratification but a veto right 
against Treaty revision. See P. KIIVER, The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory 
and Empirical Reality, London, 2012, p. 10.  
136 G. BUSIA, op.cit., p. 409. 
137 B. DE WITTE, Revision, in EuConst L. R., n. 1/2005, p. 138. 
138 Decisions under the TFEU or Title V of the TEU (external action and CFSP), except “decisions with military 
implications or those in the area of defence”. 
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Given this ‘self-amending’ clause applicable to a wider range of cases, the simplified procedures presents 
what in national constitutional framework was identified as exceptional or restricted revision, with all the 
consequences drawn up by the amendability paradigm. However, the question whether the simplified 
revision can or cannot be used with regard to some provisions turns out to be a substantive one.139 In 
this sense, it can be assessed that the text of the Treaties laid down explicit limits to the revision process. 
For instance, subject-matters comprised in the Part Three of TFEU – internal market and the four 
freedoms, area of freedom, security and justice, economic, monetary, and social policy – can be changed 
with the simplified procedure; this means that, negatively formulated, all provisions of TEU Preamble – 
the EU general principles, non-discrimination, citizenship, external actions, and institutional and financial 
issues – are excluded from amendment process. It is clear that simplified procedure cannot be used to 
increase the EU competences, in contrast to the ordinary procedure which allow amendments both to 
increase and reduce them.  
Moreover, the scope of application of this simplified procedure is quite limited140: decisions about the 
EU's own resources and about its multi-annual financial framework, decisions based on the ‘flexibility 
clause’ of Article 352 TFEU and sanctions against states violating fundamental rights or the EU's other 
fundamental values, cannot be made subject to the co-decision procedure and/or qualified majority 
voting by means of the passerelle.  
It is not that Article 48 TEU grants the Member States the power to amend the EU treaties as they wish. 
Lisbon Treaty, as a written ‘supreme’ text141, include detailed procedural requirements but do not provide 
explicit constraints on the ‘formal European constitutional changes’. Searching those substantive 
requirements of amendability may revel deeper constitutional structures that trigger the text of the 
Treaties. 
The substantive rigidity entrenched in the TEU emphasizes the constitutional aspiration of the provisions 
and translates them into enforceable norms. Using insights of national constitutional law, these 
provisions represents the ‘core norms’ and values which design the unamendable boundaries of EU 
primary law. Beyond the Preamble’s provisions that are unchangeable as results from the ‘negative’ 
interpretation of the constraints outlines under the simplified procedure, the ECJ has clearly hinted at 
the existence of substantive limits under the ordinary procedure: ‘the very foundation’ of the EU that can 
never be amended or abolished by means of EU judicial system (at least can only be integrated and 
                                                          
139 See ECJ Judgment of 27 November 2012, Case C-370-12, Pringle v Government of Ireland, nyr.  
140 Article 353 TFEU. 
141 K. LENAERTS – P. VAN NUFFEL, European Union Law, 3rd ed., London, 2011, p. 819. 
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perfected); constitutional values of Article 2 TEU which, consequently, constraints the objectives of 
Union (enshrined by Article 3 TEU).142 
The Treaty remains silent with regards to some ‘constitutional’ principles: either explicitly provides a 
similar German ‘eternity clause’ or that the ‘spirit’ of the Treaty is unamendable or unreviewable. Anyway, 
ECJ holds that any Treaty amendment should “assure respect for the autonomy of [EU] legal order”.143 
Finally, a last aspect that should be considered concerns the vetoing power of national parliaments. In 
this regard, any such simplified amendment based on Article 48(7) TEU and the passerelles spéciales for 
measures with reference to family law with cross-border implications144, are subject to a their veto – 
independent of government,145 exercisable within six month period following the European Council 
decision.146 In this perspective, the double-phased approach to Treaty revision is not entirely abandoned.  
The difference with the ordinary revision mechanism is that national parliaments, instead of being 
required to give their ‘positive approval’ to proposed amendments, will have the option of expressing 
their disagreement by vetoing a proposed amendment,147 which, from a constitutional design perspective, 
increase their authority in the amendment processes but also may create barriers to constitutional change 
as well as produce undemocratic amendment process. 
 
5. Conclusion: Towards Supranational Paradigm(s) 
All fundamental laws need rules for amendments. Both national constitutional law and EU primary law 
contains express amendment procedures.148 Formal amendment rules serve a variety of different 
                                                          
142 Opinion 1/91, European Court Reports 1991, I-06079, at para. 71; EEA Case; Kadi Case. See R. PASSCHIER 
– M. STREMLER, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in European Union Law: Considering the Existence of 
Substantive Constraints on Treaty Revision, in CJICL, n. 5(1)/2016; R. SCHÜTZE, op.cit., pp. 139-142.  
143 Opinion 1/91, para. 35. 
144 Article 81(3) TFEU. 
145 The national parliaments do not possess a similar veto power under the passerelles spéciales under Article 81(3) 
TFEU (measures concerning family law), Article 153(2) TFEU (certain fields of employment and social security 
law), Article 192(2) TFEU (certain environmental policy matters), Article 312(2) TFEU (multi-annual financial 
framework). Also Article 333 TFEU, whereby the Council may change the voting requirement for an action under 
enhanced cooperation from unanimity to qualified majority, or from special legislative procedure to ordinary 
legislative procedure. Only Member States involved in the enhanced cooperation can vote. The broadest of the 
passerelles spéciales is included in Article 31(3) TEU and refers to the whole common foreign and security policy.  
146 See also Article 6 of the Protocol on national parliaments. 
147 It is not clear from the text whether, in countries with bicameral parliaments, each of the two chambers possess 
this veto power. 
148 D. LUTZ, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., n. 88/1994, pp. 335-356. 
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proposes and functions,149 and their main aim is to provide an ordered legal process to accomplish 
necessary and inevitable constitutional changes.150 
Evidently, constitutional legitimacy derives from a combination of national community and subnational 
units, as well as from a merge between supranational entity and national States. From the national 
theoretical and empirical perspective, this paper presents findings of various reasons for bicameralism 
allowing sub-national units to participate directly or indirectly in the constitutional amendment processes 
and stresses diverse mechanisms of constitutional change process identifying a summary of national 
paradigms. Despite this study is not exhaustive, these findings suggest that there is no suitable model: 
every legal order presents different instrumental solutions according to different goals but is able to order 
the representation of varied categories of interests and to ensure their effectively participation in the 
formal amendment process. 
On the basis of national patterns on formal amendments, this paper aims to make a small contribution 
to our understanding of the important issue that concerns us, namely the European design of Treaties 
revision rules and their degrees of rigidity. Beyond the formal and substantial qualities of these rules 
describing a unique paradigm, the most important aspects is that of the direct role assigned to national 
parliaments in the European amendment process.151  
The participation of national parliaments in the Treaty revision procedures as set up by the Article 48 
TEU delivers and conceptualizes the intermediate rigidity of an amendment process. There is no doubt that 
their inclusion in the Treaty revision process have strengthened its rigidity, especially through the vetoing 
power. However, their involvement seems to be insufficient both with regard to its control over the 
European (fragmented) Executive152 and within the representation context that rendered difficult the 
good functioning of the European democracy.153  
Although the Lisbon Treaty has brought important changes, the Euro-crisis stimulated a new discussion 
on the institutional architecture of EU. Notwithstanding an institutional reform for reconfiguring the 
relationship between Council and European Council in the sense of their unification in a real Upper 
                                                          
149 R. ALBERT, op.cit., p. 913. 
150 S LEVINSON, Imperfection and Amendability, in ID. (ed.), Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of 
Constitutional Amendment, New Jersey, 1995, p. 4. 
151 This new role of national parliaments concerning the powers granted to national parliaments in the Treaty 
revision process is extended to the right to take part in the conventions for Treaty revisions, the ‘bridging clauses’ 
leading to simplified revision and voting procedures (Article 48 TEU), and the ‘historical’ clause permitting an 
extension of the Union powers (Article 352 TFEU).  
152 See D. CURTIN, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution, Oxford, 2009, p. 
71; N. LUPO, Parlamento europeo, op.cit., p. 4. 
153 N. LUPO, Parlamento europeo, op.ult.cit., p. 4. 
  
33        federalismi.it - ISSN 1826-3534                        |n. 9/2018 
 
 
 
  
House,154 it should be considered also the role of other institutions, and especially those of the national 
parliaments in the decision-making loop.  
Already constitutional scholarship stands the thesis of a ‘(virtual) Third Chamber’ in the EU framework 
which represents national parliaments as guardians of principle of subsidiarity.155 As demonstrated, a 
tricameral system already exists, and in which national parliaments correspond to a representative body, 
even virtually and not based on a real functioning parliamentary chamber. If so, and given their 
increasingly role in the Treaty revision process, it would be necessary to find the most appropriate means 
for a prolific dialogue between national parliaments so as to act collectively both in the interest of the 
State which they represent and in the European interest.  
First of all, in the sense of a ‘virtual third chamber’, national parliaments could become drivers of treaties 
revision changes alongside other institutions. National parliaments (in the sense of a group of them) may 
propose general amendments (as in Italy) or more specific subject-matters (as Austrian model) – always 
acting in the general European interests and not autonomous into European dynamics. Moreover, full 
revision process by a Convention – in which national parliaments could be collectively represented – 
would undeniably give more authority to these European ‘territorial units’, as well as more ‘constitutional’ 
ground than a classic intergovernmental conference to the Treaty revision process.156 
A different challenge could regard their representation at European level: create a new European 
Parliament into ‘reversed European bicameralism’. It could return the proposal of d’Estaing with regards 
to a ‘Congress of the European peoples’ but made up by representatives elected directly by the European 
citizens and representative nominated by national parliaments. In such configuration is not only 
integrated the general representation but also find voice more directly the ‘territorial’ entities that 
compound the EU, avoiding in this way any feeling of exclusion or, worst, attempts of independence.  
Stating that the most important feature to be able to transform the Treaty into a Constitution is a 
constitutional approval procedure and a review process involving both European demos and Member 
States, a more incisive participation of national legislatures in the process of ‘formal European 
                                                          
154 See F. FABBRINI, The Relation between the European Council and the Council: Institutional Arguments in Favor of an EU 
Senate, in Eur. Pub. L., n. 22/2016 (proposing that European Council should become the EU Senate absorbing the 
legislative power of the Council).  
155 See I. COOPER, The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU, in JCMS, n. 
44(2)/2006, pp. 281–304; ID., A “Virtual Third Chamber” for the European Union? National parliaments after the Treaty 
of Lisbon, in West Eur. Politics, n. 35(3)/2012, pp. 441-465; ID., Bicameral or Tricameral? National Parliaments and 
Representative Democracy in the European Union, in J. Eur. Integration, n. 35(5)/2013, pp. 531-546. 
156 For other constitutional features necessary to transform the Treaty in a European constitution see L.S. ROSSI, 
A New Revision of the EU Treaties After Lisbon? in L.S. ROSSI – F. CASOLARI (eds.), The EU after Lisbon. Amending 
or Coping with the Existing Treaties?, Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 3-19. 
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constitutional change’ and their configuration as ‘territorial parliaments’ in the European whole seem 
indispensable; and so, new paradigms in the supranational framework could be shaped. 
